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The Hampel Committee 
Report: a transatlantic critique 
To an American observer, the activities of the Cadbury, Greenbwy 
and Hampel Committees are impressive, if only because so few 
lawyers seem to be involved. Unlike the US, where improve-
ments in corporate governance can usually be traced to legisla-
tion or litigation, British efforts at self-governance offer an 
attractive, alternative model. The Hampel Report is disappoint-
ing, however, in three respects: the report lacks concrete mod-
els; its reliance on the AGM as a mechanism of reform is 
misplaced; and its failure to recognise internal monitoring 
programmes as an essential element of good corporate govern-
ance is shortsighted. 
Introduction 
As an American, I have observed with considerable awe and 
respect the resources that have been devoted 
 to improving 
corporate governance In Britain. Since the creation of PRO- 
NED in the 1980s, some of the most interesting innovations in 
this area seem to have come from Britain. In addition, the 
process by which British businesses have addressed the 
problems of governance have a singularly appealing charac-
ter. 
Let me be more specific. While in the United States most 
improvements in corporate governance have arisen in re-
sponse to the actions of lawyers, in Britain, it seems, im-
provements in corporate governance have arisen largely 
because business leaders have tried to address business 
problems by employing a businesslike approach: (1) identify 
the problem; (2) gather information from all available sources; 
(3) consider possible solutions; (4) set a course of action; and 
(5) implement the programme. The motivation behind these 
actions may well have been to avoid more regulation by the 
state. But the process of corporate-governance reform in 
Britain seems very different from, and more sensible than, 
the lawyer-driven approach to corporate governance we 
have become accustomed to in the US. 
The composition of the Cadbury Committee, for example, 
was remarkable to me in its variety and the degree of power 
it represented. The same applies to the Greenbury and 
Hampel Committees.1 The sponsorship of these committees 
was itself a revelation. To bring together the resources of the 
Stock Exchange, the CBI, the Institute of Directors, leading 
institutional investors and accountants—all for the purpose 
of trying to improve the quality of corporate governance and 
accountability—makes a statement of shared commitment 
that would be unimaginable—though probably quite desir-
able—in the United States? We seem instead to have en-
trusted most of our corporate-governance discussions to the 
membership of the American Law Institute.' 
Though I am a member of the ALI, I don't believe that 
lawyers (or judges or even legal scholars) are necessarily the 
greatest source of wisdom into how to make complex enter-
prises work well, prosper and grow, and generate wealth for 
all concerned. Certainly, devising corporate-governance rules 
as a product of contentious, high-stakes litigation, as has 
occurred repeatedly in the US,' is not the ideal scenario for 
nuanced, careful thinking on the issue. Thus, the inclusive, 
proactive approach that I have observed in Britain seems to 
1 	 One thing that did strike me, of course, was the fact that ali three of these 
committees were comprised exclusively of men. It surprised me that no 
one could identify even a single woman of sufficient professional creden-
tials—either in the business or academic worlds—to merit an appoint-
ment to any of these committees. 
2 The closest we have come in the US to this kind of shared commitment to 
improved corporate governance is the project undertaken by the Working 
Group on Corporate Governance, comprised of three corporate execu-
tives (all lawyers), two prominent attorneys in private practice and three 
representatives of institutional investors. See 'A New Compact for Owners 
and Directors' (1991) 141 Harvard Business Review, July/August. 
3 The ALI is comprised of 3,000 or so lawyers, judges and law professors and 
was the sponsor of the Principles of Corporate Governance project, 
completed in 1992. 
4 See, eg, Unocal Corp a Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985) (holding 
that a board may invoke defence mechanisms In the face of a hostile 
takeover bid, but only so long as the defence is proportionate to the threat 
posed); Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del 
1986) (holding that, at some point, a board must terminate its efforts to 
avoid a takeover and put the company up for auction); Paramount 
Communications Inc a Time Inc 571 A 2d 1140 (Del 1989) (holding that a company 
confronted with a cash takeover hid may resist that bid, if directors can 
point to a long-term business plan that they believe presents a better 
opportunity for the company); Paramount Communications Inc v PVC 
Network Inc 637 A 2d 34 (Del 1994) (holding that when a company 
undertakes a transaction leading to a change In corporate control, the 
directors' obligation is to obtain the best value reasonably available to the 
stockholders). 
me far preferable to the American model. 
A related phenomenon is the apparent belief among UK 
business leaders that self-regulation--frequently the resort 
of those about to be regulated—may actually work. This 
belief may, of course, be a function of the power of the parties 
who have leant their support to, and the broad consultative 
process that goes into, the creation of a self-governance 
programme. But my experience in America is that blue-
ribbon panels—however distinguished—and codes of best 
practices—however carefully designed—seldom generate 
behavioural change in a consistent, dependable way. Rather, 
whatever true reform in American corporate-governance 
practices has come about in the last 20 years has occurred 
because: (1) the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
required that the change occur;' (2) the Delaware Supreme 
Court has ruled that failure to make such a change may 
expose directors to personal liability; 6 (3) a United States 
federal district court has either required or prohibited spe-
cific governance behaviour (typically related to disclosure); 7 
 (4) the company in question has been castigated by the very 
aggressive American business press for failing to make the 
change;8 or (5) a core group of independent directors has 
forced the change over the objection of company managers. 9 
 The motivation for change has typically been fear or shame. 
Aspirational notions of simply trying to do things better 
seldom are part of the mix. 
Stated another way, the processes by which American 
public companies (slowly) came to have a majority of outside 
directors on their boards; by which the nominating process 
for new directors (slowly) migrated from exclusive CEO 
control to shared control with outside directors; by which 
serious intervention into the management of poorly perform-
ing companies—including removal of the CEO and other top 
executives—(slowly) became a real option for thoughtful, 
proactive boards of directors; or by which the value of 
designating a lead director (if not in fact dividing the roles of 
chairman and chief executive) (slowly) is becoming recog-
nised by American public companies—all can be traced 
either to a fear of litigation or fear of an exposé in the Wall 
Street Journal, not to any organised effort at self-regulation.' 10 
 
5 See, eg, SEC Exchange Act Release 34-31327 (Executive Compensation 
Disclosure) (1992) (describing in detail how executive compensation 
decisions are to he communicated to shareholders). 
6 See, eg, Smith a van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985) (holding that directors 
may be held personally liable if they fail to devote adequate time to 
determining the fair price for a sale of the company); Re Caremark 
International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 A 2d 959 (Del Ch 1996) (holding 
that directors may he held personally liable for failure to ensure that an 
appropriate information and reporting system is in place within the 
company). 
7 See, eg, Irving Bank Corp a Bank of New York Lb Inc 692 F Supp 163 (SDNY 
1988) (tender offeror prohibited from going forward, unless substantial 
additional disclosure is provided by means of a supplemental prospec-
tus); American Comers Inc a Baytree Investors Inc 685 F Supp 800 (D Kan 
1988) (same); and Kaufman a Cooper Companies Inc 719 F Supp 174 (SDNY 
1989) (annual meeting is enjoined and ali proxies voided, so that both 
parties to a proxy contest may provide accurate disclosure to sharehold-
ers). 
8 See, eg, John A Byrne, The Best and Worst Boards' {1997) 90 Business 
Week, 8 December (identifying and discussing companies with the worst 
corporate-governance scores—this is an annual exercise). 
9 See, eg, Robert AG Monks and Neli Minow, Corporate Governance (1995), 
360-8 (describing the 'palace coup' by non-executive directors at General 
Motors Corp in 1992). 
10 Even with all this progress, 'it is safe to say that American boards to day are 
still only marginally more effective than they were ten years ago. On a scale 
of 1 to 10, they may collectively have moved from, say 2 or 3 to maybe 4 or 
5. So there is plenty of scope for significant further improvement.' Robert 
AG Monks and Nell Minow, Watching the Watchers' Corporate Governance 
Similarly, the improvements that have occurred in the 
setting of executive compensation in the United States have 
been energised, in turn, by (1) intense press scrutiny of 
overpaid executives;" (2) a directive by the SEC requiring 
detailed annual disclosure of the compensation paid to direc-
tors and the five most highly paid executives of each public 
company; 12 and (3) legislation by the US Congress, withhold-
ing the corporate tax deduction for any compensation paid in 
excess of $1m, unless that compensation is 'performance 
based.13 American financial disclosure requirements are im-
posed by legislation and monitored carefully by the SEC. 
By contrast, substantial progress has been achieved in 
Britain in several areas of corporate-governance practice just 
since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, without 
the intervention of the government and (apparently) without 
the threat of litigation. The Report on Compliance with the 
[Cadbury Committee's] Code of Best Practice 14 details meas-
urable improvements by listed companies in the nominating 
process, the determination of executive compensation and 
the identification of lead directors. According to the Financial 
Times, there have been other 'clear changes for the better in 
UK corporate-governance practices' since Cadbury. 15 I take 
these changes to include better financial controls, better 
communications with shareholders and a more thoughtful 
approach to corporate-governance issues generally. 
This is a remarkable record of progress in a very short 
period of time and is all the more remarkable in light of the 
fact that British investors lack two of the 'big sticks' which are 
available in the United States to reinforce shareholder de-
mands: the shareholder class action lawsuit; and auditor 
liability to third parties. Without those tools (both of which 
have been criticised and both of which recently have been 
curtailed in the United States), 16 many of the corporate-
governance reforms Americans now look to as models, sim-
ply would not have come about. Without the further 'big stick' 
of the SEC (and judges who enforce its rules), the current high 
quality of disclosure in the United States—financial disclo-
sure generally and disclosure of executive compensation 
specifically—would never have been achieved. 
Thus, to see British business leaders pursuing these objec-
tives voluntarily—or at least to be moving in the right direc-
tion—is impressive and seems almost Victorian in its 
uprightness. Though some may doubt the sincerity of these 
efforts,17 few can doubt that the Cadbury Report was bold, 
clear-headed and shrewd in its approach to shaping corpo-
rate behaviour; that the Greenbury Report tackled an issue 
that many would have preferred to leave unexamined and 
issued a code of best practices that was both sensible and 
exacting; and that the Hampel Committee Report, though less 
innovative than the other two, has moved the discussion 
for the 21st Century (1996), 295. 
11 See, eg, John A Byrne, That Eye-Popping Executive Pay: Is Anybody Worth 
This Much?' (1994) Business Week, 25 April at 52; James W Michaels, 
'Should Anyone Earn $25,000 a Day?' (1992) Forbes, 25 May; Shawn Tully, 
'What CEOs Really Make' (1992)Fortune, 15 June; Dana Wechsler, 'Would 
Adam Smith Pay Them So Much?' (1990) Forbes, 28 May. 
12 See note 5 above. 
13 Internal Revenue Code, s 162(m). 
14 24 May 1995. 
15 Editorial, 'Governance' Financial Times, 29 January 1998. 
16 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 significantly raised the 
requirements for shareholders wishing to sue companies for disclosure 
violations in federal courts. A decision by the United States Supreme Court 
In 1994 held that shareholders cannot employ an aiding-and-abetting 
theory to sue companies' auditors in federal courts. 
17 See Robert Bruce, 'Hampel Offers Up a Big Serving of Fudge' The Times, 5 
February 1998. 
forward and promises to consolidate in one place the current 
understanding of achievable corporate-governance practices. 
A third impressive feature of the UK's recent corporate-
governance activities, from my perspective, has been the 
refusal of all three committees to be lured too deeply into the 
'other constituencies' debate. This debate, of course, has 
been going on for decades. 18 It surfaces periodically, espe-
cially when a constituency wants to advance its position. 
Sometimes the agitator is a consumer group;" sometimes it 
is an employee group; 20  sometimes, as in the case of environ-
mental grievances, it is a more broadly based group. These 
groups almost always have a valid claim against a particular 
company or industry. None has ever yet, however, presented 
a claim sufficient to persuade policy-makers either in Britain 
or the United States that the profit-maximising norms of 
classic corporate law should be amended in Its favour!' 
Therefore, it would not have been a productive use of these 
committees' resources to trudge down the 'other constituen-
cies' road again. 22 
In a nutshell, then, the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel 
Committees all appear to have done an impressive job of 
keeping focused on the most important issues surrounding 
corporate-governance concerns: (1) identifying those prac-
tices that help boards of directors function and lead most 
effectively; (2) encouraging useful communications with in-
vestors and the public; and (3) empowering (and admonish-
ing) all of the company's constituents to play the role they are 
best suited to play in the complex task of stimulating corpo-
rate growth and performance. They have done so with alac-
rity," and produced three high-quality work products. I 
question some of the results, however, and it is to these areas 
that I now turn. 
Focusing on the Hampel Committee Report, three specific 
items captured my attention: (1) the Committee's failure to 
provide models for the behaviour they prescribe; (2) the 
Committee's professed belief that any significant change can 
be accomplished in the context of the AGM; and (3) the 
Committee's failure of nerve in recognising that in-house 
compliance programmes can provide important support for 
the board's monitoring role, but declining to recommend that 
every public company adopt such a programme, specifically 
tailored to its needs. 
18 See, eg, AA Berle, Jr, 'Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust' (1931) 44 
Harvard Law Review 1049; E Merrick Dodd, Jr, For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145; AA Berle, Jr, 'For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 
1365; and E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 'Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary 
Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?' (1935) 2 University of Chicago 
Law Review 194. 
19 See, eg, Ralph Nader, Taming the Giant Corporation (1976); and Ralph 
Nader, The Consumer and Corporate Accountability (1973). 
20 See, eg, Your Stake at Work: TUC Proposals for a Stakeholder Economy 
(1996), 23-4 (proposing that company law be amended to Include required 
compliance with both the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes and also propos-
ing that directors' duties should include specific obligations to stakeholders 
other than shareholders). 
21 The 'other constituency' statutes that have been passed In the United 
States do not alter the primary objective of profit-maximisation. They 
simply give express permission for (and in the state of Connecticut 
require) boards to consider the interests of other stakeholders when 
considering strategic options. Section 309 of the Companies Act, dealing 
with employees, similarly does not alter a company's primary duty to its 
shareholders. 
22 I understand the Labour government has been giving serious thought as 
to how an other-constituencies perspective might be implemented. See 
'Beckett Urges Modernisation of Company Law Financial Times, 5 March 
1998. One should feel greatly comforted that the government is approach-
ing this question with caution. 
23 By contrast, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance project took 14 
Modelling good behaviour 
When it comes to disclosure, American companies have little 
doubt about what information they are obliged to deliver, and 
how they are supposed to deliver it. The SEC has set out in 
meticulous detail both the content and format for disclosures 
relating to directors' past history and current activities, 
conflicts of interest, legal and financial entanglements, at-
tendance at meetings, committee assignments, etc." It also 
prescribes very specifically the way in which executive com-
pensation is to be disclosed," the way in which a company's 
short-term and long-term financial performance in relation to 
its competitors is to be disclosed , 28 the items to be addressed 
in the management's discussion and analysis of the past 
year's performance and future prospects," and a number of 
other items that are identified as important in the Hampel 
Committee Report. There Is nothing magical about the SEC-
imposed model, and I am not suggesting that Hampel failed by 
not embracing that particular model or any other. But giving 
company executives a clearer idea of what good behaviour 
and good disclosure look like in detail—where possible by 
using excerpts from recent company reports but where no 
'real' models yet exist, by creating simulated examples in 
several alternative formats—would have made the Hampel 
Committee report more immediately useable by those at 
whom it was aimed. 28 
Reliance on the AGM as a mechanism of true 
accountability 
In most American companies—and most British ones, too, I 
suspect—the annual shareholders' meeting is a mostly 
scripted event full of self-congratulation, promises for the 
future, gratitude to those present and assurances that the 
management team is vigilant and forward-thinking. Only 
rarely—if ever—does the meeting have a measurable impact 
on the operations of the company or on the company's 
constituents. 
Occasionally, a meeting erupts into spectacle, with a hand-
ful of critics seeking to commandeer the proceedings, com-
plaining about how much money the executives are making, 
or hurling demands for the CEO's immediate resignation. 
This is not an ideal way to ensure that best practices are 
achieved. 
Some reformers have advocated making more out of the 
AGM, to include consideration of detailed budgets and a line-
by-line review of the preceding year's performance." Others 
advocate turning the AGM into a truly 'public occasion' with 
debates featuring 'chosen representatives of the workers, 
consumers and the community'." My suggestion is just the 
opposite—that shareholders' meetings as we know them 
years (from 1978 to 1992) to complete. 
24 Regulation S-K, Items 401 and 404. 
25 !bid, item 402. 
26 !bid, Item 201. 
27 (bid, item 303. 
28 1 understand that there exists a Stock Exchange and Chartered Account-
ants Annual Award for Published Accounts. While this is a laudable 
exercise, it does not include circulation to listed companies of the 'win-
ning' reports. More importantly, the criteria for winning entries gives only 
sparse guidance on the way in which corporate-governance Issues should 
be treated ('good disclosure on corporate governance' is required). 
29 Godfrey Rehaag, The Limited Company: Replacing the Victorian Steam 
Engine (1994), 53-4. Rehaag would have the assembled body consider 
whether the company had achieved its goals regarding 'improving quality, 
reducing staff turnover, Increasing productivity ... even reducing the 
corporation's environmental footprint'. 
30 DG Goyder, The Just Enterprise (1987), 77-9.  
should be abolished, except where some threshold number 
of investors—say 12-20 percent of the total—is in agreement 
that a meeting is necessary and appropriate." The threshold 
could easily be met by institutional investors, and it would 
not be impossible even for private investors to initiate the 
process, especially when the issues involved are significant. 
This proposal would save a lot of time on pageantry; it would 
also make such meetings as occur truly useful ones, for which 
investors and their advisors would carefully prepare and at 
which serious performance-related issues (however 'per-
formance' may be defined) could be examined in depth. 
Merely the convening of a meeting would be a noteworthy 
event and would signal a level of concern about a company 
that would command the management's attention. 
I recognise the idea of abandoning the in-person AGM may 
reflect a cultural difference between our countries. 32 In the 
United States, much of the hard work of corrective corporate 
governance (which is usually what shareholders are con-
cerned about) now often takes place in closed rooms, where 
institutional investors—alone or in groups—meet with un-
comfortable top executives and ask them very pointed, very 
specific question S. 33 
Often this work takes place very publicly, too—when 
institutional investors publish lists of underperforming tar-
gets for their activities, when there are 'leaks' of discussions 
aimed at identifying and correcting a company's biggest 
problems, and (sometimes especially) when the business 
press becomes involved and prints its own critiques of a 
company's strategic choices, the management's claims of 
progress or even individuals' management styles. 
My point is that, in a highly developed economy, there are 
far more effective ways to monitor and correct executive 
behaviour—whether it be shirking, self-dealing, lack of vision 
or incompetence—than to entrust these important issues to 
the psychodrama of the AGM. For the Hampel Committee to 
have given so much credibility to the AGM, therefore, was 
surprising. For the Committee to state expressly that its 
intention was to make the AGM 'a more meaningful and 
interesting occasion for [the] participants' 34 and to avoid 
stifling 'debate' 35 was especially disappointing. 
It may be that concerns about the Insider Dealing Act—or 
simply inertia—deters institutions in Britain from playing a 
significant behind-the-scenes role in corporate oversight." 
Or that companies are not yet comfortable in providing 
31 In those years when actual meetings are not convened, routine matters 
requiring shareholder votes would be handled exclusively by proxy 
voting. 
32 I understand, for example, that at a recent AGM of British Gas more than 
5,000 shareholders showed up. That kind of turnout is unheard of in the 
United States, though some shareholders' meetings do draw several 
hundred participants. Often these meetings draw demonstrators and 
picketers, too. 
33 Recent studies show that the collective result of these activities, known as 
the 'CalPERSeffect', has been significantly to enhance investment returns. 
Constance EBagley and Richard H Koppes, 'Leader of the Pack A Proposal 
for Disclosure of Board Leadership Structure' (1997) 34 San Diego Law 
Review 149, note 9 and accompanying text. 
34 Hampel Committee Report, para 5.13. 
35 !bid, para 5.14. 
36 John Piender makes the case that British institutions, with a handful of 
exceptions, have (at worst) been disinterested and (at best) been ineffec-
tive in their behind-the-scenes dealings with British plcs: John Plender, A 
Stake in the Future (1997), 134-7. Professor Stapiedon paints a somewhat 
richer picture of some institutions' behind-the-scenes influence, espe-
cially in their dealings with non-executive directors: GP Stapledon, Institu-
tional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (1996), 77-8, 120-9 and 
146-9. 
access to investors to explore their concerns." If that is the 
case, then investors—both large and small—may feel that 
they have no other option than to use the AGM to make their 
points. (Also, the AGM unquestionably provides an opportu-
nity for Investors seeking publicity to command the press's 
attention, and they may value this attention more than they 
value real change.) 
Either way, the next step in corporate governance, it seems 
to me, will be to recognise the AGM for what it is—an artefact 
of the days when companies at best had a handful of owners. 
The AGM provides an illusion of participatory democracy that 
really makes little sense in today's more complex world. 
Looking to in-house compliance programmes as an 
essential feature of effective corporate governance 
The Hampel Committee Report in its section on internal 
controls wisely notes that good corporate governance goes 
beyond the boundaries of the Cadbury Committee's recom-
mendations. Ensuring that adequate financial controls are in 
place is only a first step in building a truly successful, ac-
countable company. As the Hampel Report recognises, inter-
nal controls must also extend to 'controls to ensure effective 
and efficient operations and compliance with laws and 
regulations'.38  That being said, however, the Report then declines 
to include the creation of internal monitoring programmes 
(or even a modest internal audit function) in its menu of 
recommended company best practices." That choice may 
prove to be a costly mistake. 
In the United States, In-house monitoring programmes 
have been designed primarily to avert serious failures of 
compliance with the law. They also, however, have profound 
implications for the protection of investors and other corpo-
rate constituencies. For this reason, the Delaware Chancery 
Court recently held that where there is a significant risk 
(based on past experience, recent practices or otherwise) 
that a company will violate the law (environmental regula-
tions, for example) or engage in fraud (for example, in govern-
ment contracting)—either of which can result in gargantuan 
losses to the shareholders—a board of directors has an 
obligation to ensure that the company employs information 
and reporting systems that will detect and deter these prob-
lems, including a mechanism to get information about non-
compliance directly into the hands of the board.40 '[F]ailure to 
do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, 
render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance 
with applicable legal standards.'" 
It may be that British companies haven't faced the kinds of 
huge fines and damage awards that American companies 
have faced in recent years" and that the risk of exposure of 
37 In the United States, every public company has a shareholder-relations 
function that is designed to respond to shareholder Inquiries, to facilitate 
meetings with institutional Investors and generally to make sure that the 
company's investors feel that their concerns are being attended to. A good 
description of both the reactive and proactive practices of shareholder-
relations professionals appears in Michael Useem, Executive Defence: 
Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization (1993), 131-6. 
38 Hampel Committee Report, para 6.13. 
39 !bid, para 6.14. 
40 Re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 A 2d 959 (1996). 
41 !bid at 970. 
42 The Caremark case arose out of criminal proceedings In which the com-
pany was fined $250m for multiple acts of Medicare fraud, The sharehold-
ers sought to recover some or all of these losses from Caremark's directors, 
alleging failure of oversight. In 1996, Archer Daniels Midland Co (ADM) was 
fined $100m for US antitrust violations. Shareholders recently settled a 
derivative suit against ADM's directors, employing a similar theory, for 
$8m. 
this sort seems remote. (It may also be that a reasonable 
scepticism about the utility of internal monitoring programmes 
prevails. It is true that vast resources might be spent in 
perfecting a compliance programme that turns out not to 
detect those practices that put a company in peril. It is also 
true that compliance professionals—like other staff profes-
sionals—may seek to build their empires by stressing the 
urgency of their task, while contributing little to the bottom 
line.) 
Nevertheless, a well-designed internal monitoring pro-
gramme can be central not only to avoiding criminal and civil 
liability, but also to averting insolvency. Internal audit pro-
grammes and other compliance programmes (including those 
designed to monitor compliance with a company's or indus-
try's ethical guidelines) provide an important mechanism for 
ensuring that companies are spending their money wisely, 
conducting their business legally and participating in the 
marketplace in a manner designed to achieve responsible, 
long-term success. 
Thus, for the Hampel Committee to minimise the impor-
tance of internal monitoring programmes and to say that 
'directors and management must always have the main re-
sponsibility for an effective system of controls'," without 
noting that any such system will require human and financial 
resources, leadership, influence and access to the board to 
be truly effective, reflects more confidence in directors' 
abilities than is prudent. 
The irony of corporate governance is that corporate man-
agers and their boards constantly have to navigate between 
underperformance (due to timidity and mismanagement) 
and overperformance (due to fraud and overreaching). The 
Hampel Report suggests that sometimes directors are so 
concerned about avoiding the latter that they fail to devote 
sufficient energies to avoiding the former." The Committee 
may be right, of course, but its failure to give adequate 
emphasis to the need for internal monitoring—tailored to a 
company's unique situation—seems extremely shortsighted 
to me. 
Three other issues referred to in the Hampel Committee 
Report have generated some vocal criticism: (1) the question 
of which outside directors ought to be considered 'independ-
ent' and who Is to decide in close cases; (2) the question 
whether institutional investors should be required to partici-
pate in voting; and (3) the question whether shareholders 
ought to be empowered to vote on individual compensation 
packages. 
The question of independence 
On the first question, regarding independence, one response 
would be to suggest that the answer is unimportant. A recent 
study of US companies found that the presence of independ-
ent directors on a board 'has no consistent effect on market-
adjusted stock price performance'." A more constructive 
response would be to concede that no definition will cover 
every situation and that traditional measures of independ-
ence (lack of a paid relationship to the company, for example, 
or manner of selection) cannot capture those situations 
where even those directors who appear to be independent 
may not be because of social ties, a desire to be a team player 
43 Hampel Committee Report, para 6.15. 
44 Ibid. para 3.7. 
45 Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, 'Do Independent Directors Matter?' 
(Columbia University Working Paper). Two American companies most 
often attacked for their boards' lack of independence, Walt Disney Co and 
HJ Heinz Co, have each been top performers in recent years. 
or simple passivity. 
The Hampel Report is correct in suggesting that it is 
probably not practicable to lay down a precise definition of 
`independence'.46 A number of American groups have at-
tempted to do so, as did the Cadbury Committee and, more 
recently, PIRC. And while this exercise may be useful as a 
guideline, trying to distinguish between directors who are or 
are not 'independent'—in order to meet some arbitrary goal—
misses the point." What a company wants is a good direc-
tor—one who does her homework, asks penetrating questions 
and provides real leadership both in moving the company 
forward and in keeping it out of trouble. The obsession—on 
both sides of the Atlantic—with further categorisation is not, 
frankly, all that productive." What is productive is ensuring 
that outside directors are carefully selected, well-trained, 
provided with staff when necessary, well-counseled by their 
lawyers, evaluated periodically for effectiveness by their 
colleagues, open to dialogue with institutional investors, 
compensated in a manner designed to stimulate strong long-
term performance and replaced when they become compla-
cent. Hampel made most of these points. 
Compulsory voting for institutions 
On the question of whether institutional investors should be 
required to vote, 1 am comfortable—based on the American 
experience—in suggesting that the answer should be 'yes', at 
least for those institutions that hold their shares as fiduciar-
ies for others." I am further comfortable in suggesting that 
institutions holding shares in a fiduciary capacity should 
devise voting principles on recurring issues that can be 
provided upon demand to the institution's beneficiaries. The 
US teachers' pension fund, TIAA-CREF, provides one excel-
lent example of a voting policy but there are also many 
others that one could look to as a model. There are two 
reasons for such policies—one is transparency; the other is 
cost containment. 
When American pension fund managers first came to 
appreciate, in the mid-1980s, that they were expected to 
46 Hampel Committee Report, para 3.9. 
47 The US Business Roundtable shares this view. In Its Statement on Corpo
rate Governance, issued in August 1997, the Roundtable argued that 
independence should be judged with respect to each director's circum-
stances, rather than through the 'mechanical application of rigid criteria'. 
48 I concede that the situations in Britain and the US are quite different as 
regards the impact of outside directors. The most recent study of Amer
ican boards of directors indicates that the average board is now made up 
of two Inside directors and nine outside directors:Korn/Ferry International 
24th Annual Board of Directors Study (1997). In these circumstances, the 
question of who is truly 'independent' may be less urgent than when the 
proportion of non-executive directors is much lower. 
49 Of course an institutional shareholder, like any shareholder, should be 
permitted to abstain where, in the shareholder's considered judgment, 
that is the proper course of action. Confidential voting is useful in minimis-
ing abstentions. 
50 The policy provides, inter alto, that TIAA-CREF will vote in favour of 
resolutions proposing confidential voting, against resolutions to create 
multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights, In favour of 'fair 
price' provisions that preclude selective stock repurchases, against pro-
posals that would impose any super-majority voting requirements and 
against proposed actions that would serve to eliminate shareholders' 
appraisal rights. See 'Excerpts from the TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on 
Corporate Governance' (1994) Corporate Governance Advisor. May/June; 
TIAA-CREF Guidelines for Voting Proxies on Executive Compensation' 
(1994) Corporate Governance Advisor, September/October. 
exercise their proxy-voting powers, the learning curve at first 
was admittedly steep. Now, proxy voting has become quite 
manageable—certainly there Is little difficulty in voting on 
the routine matters that come up every year. Voting policies 
minimise the cost of making decisions on most other issues 
and cost-sharing (via the use of consultancies) is available for 
responding to truly unique situations. Compulsory voting, 
should it be enacted in Britain, is nothing to be feared. 
Voting on remuneration 
The final question—regarding shareholder ratification of 
executives' compensation awards—is the least problematic 
for me. In the US, companies must submit to their sharehold-
ers the names of individual nominees for each directorial 
vacancy and certain proposals advanced by shareholders. If 
an executive compensation plan requires shareholder ap-
proval (a determination based pri mar i ly on the regulations of 
the Internal Revenue Service defining which plans are enti-
tled to preferable tax treatment), detailed information must 
be supplied (including information about the impact of the 
plan on the five most highly paid executives and on others—
like NEDs—by category).51 It is not true, however, as some 
critics believe, that American investors pass judgment on 
each top executive's paycheque, or on the annual overall 
compensation package for directors and officers as a group. 
Only stock-based compensation plans may be subject to 
shareholder approval, and not all such plans are. 
In other words, in spite of the impenetrable, densely 
worded resolutions that periodically appear on American 
proxy solicitations seeking approval for specific incentive 
compensation plans, there is no 'heckler's veto' for a compa-
ny's yearly compensation figures, nor should there be. At 
least four arguments support this position: (1) shareholder 
disapproval of executive compensation awards could lead to 
unwanted discontinuities and disruption of valuable leader-
ship; (2) the costs of compensation would likely go up under 
such a regime, rather than down; (3) the need to monitor 
compensation issues in detail (that is, executive-by-execu-
tive) would increase the burden assumed by institutions, 
with no compensating benefit; and (4) most shareholders 
would vote without adequate information, and their own self-
interest (untempered by any fiduciary obligation to others) 
may give rise to destructive opportunism. 
Requiring shareholder approval of a company's annual 
compensation package is, moreover, unnecessary. When a 
company's performance and its directors' compensation are 
significantly out  of alignment, it is usually pretty obvious and 
that is the time for action, whether it be a 'just-say-no' vote 
against the directors, back-room negotiating by institutions 
and others, criticisms by the business press, or some combi-
nation of all three. To involve shareholders In the routine 
compensation decisions of every public company everyyear-
regardless of that company's or its executives' perform-
ance—would be inefficient, costly and unwise. 
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